M&S Cox Investments, LC, a Utah Limited Liability Company, Mervyn Cox and Sue Cox v. Provo City Corporation : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
M&S Cox Investments, LC, a Utah Limited
Liability Company, Mervyn Cox and Sue Cox v.
Provo City Corporation : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Reed L. Martineau; Snow, Christensen & Martineau; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Jody K Burnett; Williams and Hunt; David C. Dixon; Assistant City Attorney; Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellee.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, M&S Cox Investments v. Provo City Corporation, No. 403654 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4727
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
M&S COX INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, Case No. 000403654 
MERVYN COX and SUE COX, Case No. 040402050 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs . 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, Argument Priority 
Classification No. 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT 
OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
REED L. MARTINEAU (2106) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
M&S Cox Investments, LC 
Mervyn Cox and Sue Cox 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
JODY K BURNETT (0499) Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
DAVID C. DIXON (0890) 
Assistant City Attorney 
Provo City 
351 West Center Street 
Post Office Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Provo City Corporation FILED 
UTAHAPPEllATFO 
NOV 3 h Lwoo 
DAVID L. ARNOLD, STEPHEN D. 
CLARK and RAYMOND V. 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Intervenors. 
IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
M&S COX INVESTMENTS, LC, a Utah 
Limited Liability Company, Case No. 000403654 
MERVYN COX and SUE COX, Case No. 040402050 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs . 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, Argument Priority 
Classification No. 
Defendant/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT 
OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
THE HONORABLE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
REED L. MARTINEAU (2106) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
M&S Cox Investments, LC 
Mervyn Cox and Sue Cox 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
JODY K BURNETT (0499) Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
Telephone: (801) 521-5678 
DAVID C. DIXON (089 0) 
Assistant City Attorney 
Provo City 
351 West Center Street 
Post Office Box 1849 
Provo, Utah 84603 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Provo City Corporation 
DAVID L. ARNOLD, STEPHEN D. 
CLARK and RAYMOND V. 
CHRISTENSEN, 
Interveners. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 1 
Issues for Review and Standard of Review 1 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
PROVISIONS 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
I. M&S ACQUIRES THE PROVO RESIDENCE 3 
II. PROVO CITY ADOPTS ITS OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE 
WITH AMORTIZATION PROVISIONS 5 
III. THE OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE'S "RECOVERY OF 
INVESTMENT" FORMULA 6 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE 
TO M&S'S PROPERTY 8 
V. PROVO CITY'S ARBITRARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
AMORTIZATION FORMULA 12 
VI. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT'S APPROVAL OF THE CITY'S 
CALCULATION 15 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 16 
ARGUMENT 17 
I. IT WAS ERROR TO RULE THAT THE DECISION OF THE 
CITY BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT WAS NOT ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL 17 
A. There Is No Evidence That the Drafters of the 
Ordinance Intended to Completely Terminate 
All Nonconforming Uses 20 
B. The City Cannot Protest M&S's Use of 
Depreciation, since the City Has Used 
Depreciation in Its Own Calculations 21 
C. The City's New Rationale for Excluding 
Unprofitable Years from the Net Income 
Total Is Contradictory and Unsupported . . . . 22 
D. Plaintiffs Are Entitled to an Open-ended 
Extension as They Have Provided Clear 
Evidence of- Prejudice 24 
II. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO DISMISS 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT *TOGETHER WITH ALL CLAIMS 
AND THEORIES ASSERTED THEREIN 2 6 
A. Plaintiffs Properly Pled Their As-Applied 
Challenges in their Complaint 2 6 
B. Plaintiffs' As-Applied Challenges Have Never 
Been Adjudicated 27 
C. The As-Applied Issue Must Be Determined Under 
the Proper Procedural Standards of Rule 56 or 
Rule 12 3 0 
III. INTERVENORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO 
INTERVENE 3 0 
A. The Intervenors Lack Standing Because They Have 
Not Alleged, and Cannot Prove, Any Special 
Damages over and above the Alleged Public 
Injury Which May Be Caused by the Purported 
Violation of the Zoning Ordinances 31 
B. The Motion to Intervene Was Untimely 33 
C. The Intervenors Cannot Intervene in this 
Lawsuit as a Matter of Right 34 
CONCLUSION 37 
ADDENDUM 39 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 2 005 UT 5, 
108 P.3d 701 27, 28 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 
634 (Utah 1989) 1 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98 P.3d 1208 . . 18, 19, 25 
Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of 
Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 108, 44 P. 3d 642 32, 33 
Gardner v. Perry City, 2000 UT App 1, 994, P.2d 811 24 
Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263 1 
Low v. City of Monticello, 2004 UT 90 P. 3d 130 2 
Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 938 (Utah 197 6) 32 
Patterson v. Utah Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 
893 P.2d 602 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 19 
Perper v. Pima County, 600 P.2d 52 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) 31-33 
Save Our Canyons v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake 
County, App 2 85 P. 3d 978 19 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332 24 
Wells v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 
936 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 25 
Statutes 
28 U.S.C. § 2347 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 (1) (a) 34, 35 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3) (d) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-2-(2) (j) 1 
Rules and Regulations 
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 30 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 33, 35 
Rule 24(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 33 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 2, 30 
Other Authorities 
Provo City Code § 14.3 0.010 4, 5 
Provo City Code § 14.30.090(2) 12-14 
Provo City Code § 14 .30 . 090 (2) (b) (ii) 12, 13 
Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30 3 
Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.030 (2) (c) 5, 6 
Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090 6, 8-11 
Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090 14 
Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090(1) 18 
Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090(2) 18 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this appeal from 
the judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, 
State of Utah, dated April 4, 2006, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-2-(2) (j) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issues for Review and Standard of Review: 
a. Did the lower court err in ruling that the decision 
of the Provo City Board of Adjustment was not arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal? In determining whether the decision of the Board of 
Adjustment was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal, the appellate 
court gives no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, 
which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. 
State, 119 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
b. Did the lower court err in dismissing "all claims 
and theories" asserted in the consolidated action with prejudice? 
In determining whether dismissal of all claims and theories was 
proper, the appellate court should construe all facts in favor of 
appellants. Hale v. Beckstead, 2005 UT 24, 116 P.3d 263. 
c. Did the lower court err in granting Intervenors' 
Motion to Intervene, thereby overriding the settlement agreement 
agreed to between the Coxes and Provo City? In reviewing the 
court's grant of the Motion to Intervene, the appellate court gives 
no deference to the trial court's conclusions of law, which are 
reviewed for correctness. Low v. City of Monticello, 2004 UT 90, 
103 P.3d 130. 
Issues preserved below. These issues were preserved in the 
following: 
• Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to 
Intervene; (R. 0381) 
• Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum Regarding Provo City 
General Plan; (R. 0408) 
• Combined Memorandum in Support of M&S Cox Investments, LC's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Provo City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment; (R. 1105) 
• Petitioners' Reply Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for 
Summary Judgment; (R. 1122) 
• Plaintiffs' Objection to Provo City's Proposed Summary 
Judgment and Order of Dismissal; (R. 1153) 
• Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant Provo City's Response to 
Plaintiffs' Objection to Its Proposed Summary Judgment and 
Order of Dismissal; (R. 1194) and 
• Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Leave to 
Intervene. (R. 03 8) 
DETERMINATIVE OR IMPORTANT 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The controlling rule is Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal comes before this Court from a final judgment of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, State of Utah, 
dated April 4, 2006 in consolidated cases Civil No. 000403654 and 
Civil No. 040402050. (R. 1209) 
The case is a dispute over (1) whether the lower court erred 
in granting Interveners' Motion to Intervene, (2) whether the lower 
court erred in dismissing "all claims and theories" in the consoli-
dated action with prejudice, and (3) whether the lower court erred 
in ruling that the determination by the Provo City Community 
Development Director ("CDD") and approved by the Board of Adjust-
ment ("BOA") that under the provisions of Provo City Ordinance 
2000-15, § 14.30 (See Attachment #1), (R. 0433) the amortization 
period applicable to M&S property was not arbitrary, capricious, 
and illegal. The decision of the CDD was appealed to the Provo City 
BOA and affirmed. (R. 1052) 
On February 16, 2 001, Provo City filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R. 0 040) On November 22, 2 005, a Motion for Summary 
Judgment was filed by M&S. (R. 0445) The District Court, the 
Honorable Steven L. Hansen presiding, granted Provo City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment by Memorandum Decision dated April 4, 2006, and 
denied the Motion for Summary Judgment of M&S. (R. 12 02) 
A final judgment was entered on April 4, 2 006 (See Attachment 
#2) . (R. 1204) M&S filed its Notice of Appeal of that summary 
judgment on April 13, 2006. (R. 1211) 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I. M&S ACQUIRES THE PROVO RESIDENCE. 
1. Petitioner M&S Cox Investments, LLC (nM&S") is the owner 
of a residential property located at 1310 North 900 East in Provo. 
(R. 1022) 
2. M&S acquired the property in 1996 for a sum of 
$192,624.00. (R. 1021) 
3. At the time M&S purchased the home, the property was zoned 
Rl-Single Family Residential, with an US" Supplementary Residential 
Overlay. The S-Overlay provisions allowed M&S to maintain an 
accessory dwelling unit, in addition to the normal dwelling unit in 
the home. There was no requirement that the owner occupy the home. 
See Attachment #1, Provo City Code § 14.30.010 et seq. (R. 0433) 
4. M&S invested large quantities of time and over a half 
million dollars remodeling the home in order to take advantage of 
Provo City's S-overlay provision. (R. 0012, 1043) 
5. In addition to the purchase price, the total amount spent 
on remodeling and updating the property, adjusted for inflation to 
April 4, 2000, was $525,829.10. See id. 
6. M&S acquired the property in order to provide housing for 
the Coxes in Provo, as well as to allow relatives of the Coxes to 
live there while attending BYU and other educational institutions 
in Utah County. See id., p. 1. It was anticipated that little or 
no rent would be charged to these relatives while they lived in the 
house. Neither M&S nor its owners ever intended for the acquisition 
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to be a profit-generating asset. It was intended to be an invest-
ment for the Cox family's advanced education. See id. 
7. This intention was carried out in reality. From 1996 to 
2 000, the house was occupied primarily by the Coxes' relatives and 
friends, most of whom paid little or no rent to M&S. See Applica-
tion for Amortization, p. 3, and records attached thereto. In those 
years, M&S realized a net loss from its ownership of the property. 
See id. 
8. M&S's extensive remodel of the residence created two 
separate dwelling units in the home, maximizing M&S's ability to 
host grandchildren, nieces and nephews, and other relatives in Utah 
County. See Statement of Grounds for Appeal. (R. 1052) 
II. PROVO CITY ADOPTS ITS OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE WITH AMORTIZA-
TION PROVISIONS. 
9. On April 4, 2 000, Provo City changed the S-Overlay 
provisions of its City Code by adopting Ordinance 2 000-15 ("the 
Owner-Occupant Ordinance"). (R. 1031 See Attachment No. 1) 
10. The Owner-Occupant Ordinance implemented a new require-
ment that owners of homes with two dwelling units must occupy one 
of those units. See id. , § 14.30 . 030 (2) (c) . Thus, in order to take 
advantage of the "S-Overlay" provisions, an owner must live in the 
home in person, rather than renting both units to tenants. Mervyn 
and Sue Cox, owners of M&S, are residents of St. George, Utah. 
11. In April of 2000, shortly after Ordinance 2000-15 was 
adopted, M&S sued Provo City in Federal Court, seeking to invalidate 
the ordinance. When that case was dismissed for failure to exhaust 
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available state law remedies, M&S filed its Complaint in the lower 
Court on November 9, 2000. (R. 0014) Among other things, M&S claims 
that Provo's ordinance defining * family" and the ordinance limiting 
ownership and occupancy of the 1310 home amount to unconstitutional 
regulatory takings of M&S's property, that the City acted beyond its 
authority in adopting the ordinances, and that the ordinances do not 
promote a legitimate purpose, with respect to the properties on 900 
East. Id. 
12. At the time when this case had been pending for almost two 
years, the parties had invested substantial time and resources in 
reaching a resolution. M&S and Provo City agreed to the terms of a 
settlement, which both parties acknowledge and agree gave M&S nothing 
more than that to which it is legally entitled under Provo's current 
ordinances. (R. 1212 at pp. 39-40) Before the parties could 
memorialize their settlement agreement in writing, however, the 
Intervenors filed their motion to intervene. (R. 0341) 
III. THE OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE'S "RECOVERY OF INVESTMENT" FORMULA. 
13 . The Owner-Occupant Ordinance allowed a non-resident owner 
of affected property to apply to the Provo City Community Develop-
ment Director ("CDD") for an extension of time in which to bring its 
property into compliance with the owner-occupant requirement. See 
Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090. 
14. This xxrecovery of investment" or "amortization" provision 
uses a mathematical formula to calculate the amount of time it will 
take the owner to recover its investment in the home. The Ordinance 
reads, in relevant part: 
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Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery of Investment. 
(1) The Community Development Director or his designee 
shall grant an owner of property affected by Subsection 
14.30.080(2) of this chapter an extension of the time 
required to conform with such section if: 
(a) the owner: 
(i) by August 4, 2000 files a notice of intent 
to apply for a time extension as provided in this section; 
and 
(ii) by April 4, 2001 files a complete applica-
tion for an extension of time as provided in this section. 
(b) the owner's application for an extension of time 
demonstrates by a preponderance of evidence that: 
(i) The nonconforming use which is the subject 
of the application was legally established; and 
(ii) subject to the formula in Subsection (2) of 
this section, the owner is unable to recover prior to April 
4, 2003 the amount of the owner's investment in the prop-
erty. 
(2) (a) The time period during which an owner may recover 
the amount of his investment in property affected by Section 
14.30.080(2) of this Chapter shall be determined by dividing 
the residual value of the property by the average monthly 
net rental income from the property. The resulting figure 
is the number of months which the owner shall have to 
recover his investment in the property. 
(b) For the purposes of this subsection the following 
definitions shall apply: 
(i) uAmount of the owner's investment" means the 
adjusted present value of the property as of April 4, 2000. 
(ii) *Adjusted present value" means a property's 
original purchase price plus any capital improvements and 
less depreciation and net income from the property, all as 
adjusted for inflation to April 4, 2000. 
(iii) "Compliance value" means the appraised value 
of the property on April 4, 2000 based on compliance with 
the requirements of this Chapter. 
(iv) vx Residual value" means the difference 
between a property's adjusted present value and its compli-
ance value as of April 4, 2000. 
(c) The time period determined under subsection (a) 
of this section shall apply to the property for which the 
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owner made an application for extension and to the owner's 
successors, if any, until such time period has run. 
(3) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Community 
Development Director or his designee applying this section 
may appeal such decision to the Board of Adjustment as 
provided in Chapter 14.05 of this title. 
(4) The Community Development Director may adopt reason-
able regulations to carry out the purpose of this section. 
Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090. 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF THE OWNER-OCCUPANT ORDINANCE TO M&S'S PROPERTY. 
15. Two days after the Ordinance was passed, counsel for M&S 
inquired of the City for information on applying for the extension. 
(R. 0981) M&S also asked for information on any regulations that 
had been adopted regarding the administration of the amortization 
formula. See id. These letters were followed with other correspon-
dence inquiring on the proper method of applying for amortization. 
(R. 0974, 0966) 
16. Counsel for Provo City responded to these inquiries by 
stating that the City viewed M&S's circumstances as a possible "test 
case" for the amortization formula. (R. 0968) Despite multiple 
inquiries by M&S, the City's correspondence never indicated that 
any regulation had ever been adopted by the CDD regarding the 
implementation of the amortization formula. (R. 0964, 0962, 0959) 
The Board of Adjustment later acknowledged that no such regulations 
have ever been promulgated. (R. 0610 at p. 96) 
17. Consistent with the provisions of the Ordinance and M&S's 
frequent correspondence with counsel for Provo City, M&S made a 
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timely application for amortization to the CDD on March 26, 2002. 
(R. 0537) 
18. M&S's application methodically followed and explained the 
City's statutory amortization formula, as applied to its property. 
See id. The application showed that, because of its high investment 
in the property and its negative net income from the property, the 
result under the City's formula is that M&S will have an infinite 
number of months to recoup its investment. See id. Thus, by 
operation of the City's formula, M&S is entitled to an unlimited 
extension of time before it is required to comply with the Owner-
Occupant Ordinance (because simple math dictates that any property 
for which net income was a negative number would be entitled to an 
unlimited period of time) . See id. 
19. Subsequent to the tender of the application for an 
extension, Provo City and M&S entered negotiations to settle the 
issue, in which Provo City indicated that M&S would receive a 
permanent exemption from the owner-occupant requirement. (R. 0922) 
20. Not long after this offer was made, a group of Provo City 
residents filed a Petition for Intervention in the case. (R. 0341) 
21. After the citizens began organizing to oppose M&S's 
permanent exemption, counsel for M&S was informed that the CDD was 
now unwilling to grant M&S's application due to political pressures 
then being brought to bear on city officials. (R. 0924, 0902) In 
the context of these political pressures, the CDD withdrew its offer 
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of an open-ended exemption, and suggested that M&S agree to a 20-
year amortization. M&S declined. See id. 
22. At the hearing on the Motion to Intervene on January 25, 
2003, the following discussion took place between David C. Dixon, 
Provo City Attorney, and the Court: 
STATEMENT BY MR. DIXON 
MR. DIXON: The only thing that occurred to 
me, your Honor, is just the settlement as I 
understand it, a, does not involve zoning en-
forcement as Mr. Call mentioned at the end there. 
In other words, if they have improper occupancy 
in the future we're not precluded from prosecut-
ing them for violations of the zoning ordinance. 
So we're not compromising any rights in terms of 
the future. We're just resolving a lawsuit that 
deals with the a, amortization provisions and 
what kinds of occupancy they would be allowed 
under our ordinances. 
THE JUDGE: So basically you agree with 
Mr. Call's argument? 
MR. DIXON: Yes. I don't think he misstated 
anything in terms of our position. 
THE JUDGE: So you want to go forward and 
settle the case? 
MR. DIXON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: Which means to me that you're 
opposing this motion to intervene because they 
don't want you to settle the case, they want to 
get involved and contest this entire settlement. 
Although you haven't said that isn't that, isn't 
that the inference I'm to draw from that that the 
city is opposing is opposing this motion to 
intervene, they want to go ahead and force the 
settlement agreement that they feel is a proper 
and lawful exercise of their powers and rights 
under the law? 
MR. DIXON: I think we have the right to 
settle it and we think we've got a reasonable 
settlement. (R. 1212 at pp. 39-40) 
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23. In April 2003, Provo City Attorney Gary Gregerson 
admitted to delaying final determination of M&S's request of an 
indefinite extension due to a movement by some residents of the 
Wasatch Neighborhood to intervene in the court case then pending 
against the City (now consolidated with the more recently filed 
case). (R. 0908) 
24. Meanwhile, the City asked M&S for further documentation 
of the figures used in its calculation of the amortization formula. 
(R. 0908) 
25. M&S undertook to document all of its figures and answer 
every question raised by the City. (R. 0898) At great expense, M&S 
collected and delivered to the City a set of documents reflecting 
all expenses and income related to the property between 1995 and 
2000. See id. 
26. In October 2003, the City unofficially communicated to 
M&S that the application for an unlimited exemption would be denied. 
(R. 0644, 0641, 0638) 
27. Finally, on March 9, 2004, almost one year after M&S's 
formal application, the CDD wrote to M&S informing it that it had 
been granted an extension of only 22 years and 3 months in which to 
recover its investment. (R. 0631) This period almost exactly 
matches the period suggested earlier by the CDD when they came under 
political pressure not to allow M&S the extension afforded by the 
City's formula. (R. 0924) 
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28. The CDD's denial letter did not explain how the City 
arrived at completely different numbers from those submitted by M&S 
for total capital expenses, net income, and residual value. 
(R. 0631) 
V. PROVO CITY'S ARBITRARY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMORTIZATION FORMULA. 
29. In implementing its calculation, the City plugged in 
numbers completely different from those submitted by M&S, without 
any explanation for the discrepancies. For example, where M&S 
submitted documents showing capital improvements totaling 
$525,829.10, the City's formula shows a figure of $481,490.84, 
subtracting nearly $45,000 from M&S's figure. (R 0631) 
30. Further, the City applied two different numbers in 
different places of the formula, for the same concept of "net income 
from the property." The City's formula requires the input of a 
figure for net income from the property in determining the value of 
both "adjusted present value" and "monthly net rental income from 
the property." See Provo City Code § 14.30.090(2) & (2)(b)(ii). 
In the first part of the formula, the CDD used a figure of 
($27,004.60) as "net income." (R. 0630) Then, after stating that 
net income is ($27,004.60), the CDD came up with a completely 
different figure for net income in the section of its calculation 
that calculates average monthly rental income, namely, $31,742.06. 
See id., p. 2, section 6. 
31. If the City had applied its own figure of ($27,004.60) for 
net income in section 6 of its calculation formula, the outcome of 
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the formula would have to be a negative number, giving M&S an 
unlimited exemption. See id. 
32. The Ordinance does not provide for different definitions 
of "net income from the property" in the two different parts of the 
formula that apply the concept. See Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, 
§§ 14.30.090(2) (a) & (2)(b)(ii). (R. 1031) 
33. The CDD used the positive figure for net income in the 
part of the formula that calculated average net monthly rental 
income, where a higher number will automatically decrease the 
length of the exemption period. (R. 0557) 
34. The City's second, positive figure for "net income" is 
quite different from the figure submitted by M&S, and from the 
figure produced by the City's own calculations in its own worksheet 
at section 5. M&S calculated its net income by simply adding up all 
rental receipts for the period that it owned and operated the 
property and subtracting its operating expenses. (R. 1022) The 
resulting negative number reflected that M&S spent more money than 
it made on the property, giving it a negative net income. See id. 
35. In documents provided to M&S, the City attempted to 
explain how it reached its positive "net income" figure. (R. 063 0 
p. 3) The City's accountant made the decision to only factor in 
rental income between 1999 and 2 000, stating that no earlier period 
was considered because "the property was still under renovation and 
not completely available for rent." See id. The accountant 
therefore decided that the earlier rents were irrelevant because 
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"rental income from periods prior to 1999 would not be an accurate 
reflection of expected future rental." Id. 
36. The accountant's assertion that the property was not 
*completely available for rent" until 1999 was not based on any 
evidence or finding that has ever been divulged to M&S. It is also 
directly contrary to the only evidence in the record. Specifically, 
M&S's income statements show gross rental receipts of $4,600; 
$3,882.53; and $24,635.70, respectively, for 1996, 1997, and 1998. 
See Financial Schedules attached to March 26, 2002 Application for 
Amortization, BOA Record Exhibit 12. These receipts show that M&S 
was renting its property between 1996 and 1998, despite the city 
accountant's assertions. See id. 
37. Even if it were correct that the property was not 
"completely available for rent," the Ordinance makes no provision 
for exclusion of years when a property is not being completely 
rented. See Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, § 14.30.090. 
38. The notion that "net income from the property" should 
somehow track fictional projected future rental receipts is not 
contained in the Ordinance. See id. The Ordinance simply calls for 
an accounting of "net rental income from the property." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
39. The City's second figure for "net income" relies on just 
such a future projection of fictional income. In coming up with the 
total of $31,742.06, the City combined the net rental receipts for 
1999 with the receipts for the first six months of 2000, and then 
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added projected receipts for the final six months of 2000, for which 
no data was available. (R. 630 p. 2, section 6) The Ordinance makes 
no provision for speculating on future rental income in the 
amortization calculation. See Provo City Ordinance 2000-15, 
§ 14.30.090. 
40. In summary, in arriving at a positive number for average 
monthly net rental income, the City selected the income figures for 
the only 18-month period in which M&S had positive net rental 
receipts and ignored those months for which M&S had a negative net 
rental income. Id., p. 3. By using numbers from only 1999 and the 
first six months of 2000 (and then adding the projected future 
receipts of the last six months of 2000) , the City arrived at a 
positive number for net income. Id., p. 2. If it had included all 
the years of "net rental income from the property" as submitted by 
M&S, both net income figures used by the City would have been 
negative numbers, assuring an open-ended extension for M&S. By 
using a positive number as "net income" in only one part of the 
amortization formula, the City "calculated" a finite number of 
months for M&S's extension. See id. 
VI. THE BOARD OF ADJUSTMENTS APPROVAL OF THE CITY'S CALCULATION. 
41. M&S appealed the CDD's decision to the Provo City Board 
of Adjustment. See Notice of Appeal. (R. 1046) 
42. At an appeal hearing held on May 20, 2004, the Board of 
Adjustment heard argument from both M&S and Provo City, and denied 
relief to M&S. (R. 614) 
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43. During the hearing, some Board members expressed their 
view that it seemed unfair for M&S to allow tenants to live in its 
space without paying market value rents. (R. 610, pp. 19, 97) 
44. Board members also expressed a desire to require the 
outcome of the formula to be "reasonable. " See id., pp. 95-97, 99. 
At the same time, Board members also expressed confusion about what 
the limits of a "reasonable" exemption period might be. See id., 
pp. 67, 96. 
45. In its stated findings of fact, the Board explicitly 
based its denial of relief on the authority of the CDD to make 
reasonable regulations in applying the City's formula. See Board 
of Adjustment Report of Action. (R. 614, p. 3, Finding No. 8) The 
central role this regulation-making power played in the Board's 
decision was illustrated by many Board members' comments during the 
hearing. (R. 610, pp. 67, 97-98) This occurred even while one Board 
member acknowledged that the CDD had not actually promulgated any 
regulations. See id. p. 96. 
46. M&S timely filed its Petition for Review with the Court 
on May 5, 2004, stating claims for relief from the Board of 
Adjustment's decision. (R. 1048) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Having pursued extended negotiations a settlement of all 
issues in this case was arrived at between plaintiffs and Provo City 
that both parties believed protected their respective interests. 
Before the agreement could be memorialized the lower court, in 
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error, permitted the intervenors to enter the case to object to and 
second guess the City's decision to settle. The lower court erred 
because the intervenors have no standing in this case. 
After retracting from its agreed-upon settlement the City then 
misapplied its owner occupant ordinance. The City had previously 
agreed that plaintiffs were entitled to an indefinite period to 
recoup their investment in the property without having to comply 
with the owner occupant ordinance. Under political pressure from 
the intervenors, however, the City's Community Development Director 
("CDD") and the City Board of Adjustment ("BOA"), through improper 
creative and selective manipulation of the certain provisions of 
the ordinance, arrived at an amortization period of 22 years and 3 
months rather than an indefinite period required by faithful 
application of the ordinance. The lower court erred when it 
affirmed the decisions of the CDD and BOA because the CDD's and 
BOA's (and the lower court's) application of the ordinance to 
plaintiffs was both legally wrong and arbitrary. 
In entering a final judgment the lower court again erred in 
dismissing plaintiffs' complaint "together with all claims and 
theories asserted therein" because plaintiffs' "as applied" claims 
had never been raised, briefed, argued to or decided by the court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT WAS ERROR TO RULE THAT THE DECISION OF THE CITY BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT WAS NOT ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS, OR ILLEGAL, 
Provo City failed to follow its ordinance in determining the 
length of M&S's exemption. The City's action was therefore illegal. 
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See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(3) (d) ("A determination of illegality 
requires a determination that the decision . . . violates a[n] . . . 
ordinance"). The City claimed that illegality requires a violation 
of "prohibitory or mandatory provisions" of an ordinance, and that 
such a violation is not present here. See Provo City's Combined 
Reply/Opp. Memo. p. 5. On the contrary, the ordinance in question 
repeatedly employs mandatory language. See Provo City Ordinance 
2000-15, § 14.30.090(1)("The Community Development Director . . . 
shall grant an owner . . . extension of the time required to conform 
with such section . . . ") ; id. § 14.30.090 (2) ("The time period 
during which an owner may recover the amount of his investment in 
property . . . shall be determined by dividing the residual value 
of the property by the average monthly net rental income from the 
property."). These provisions unambiguously required the City to 
perform the calculations mandated by the ordinance. The City 
violated this mandate, preferring instead to act on its own 
conceptions of legislative intent and "reasonableness." Its acts 
were therefore illegal. 
Provo City also implied, without support, that the "correct-
ness" standard under an illegality challenge is used rarely--mostly 
in instanc€^ s where procedural rules have been violated. See Provo 
City's Combined Reply/Opp. Memo. p. 3. In reality, Utah courts 
often apply the illegality standard in reviewing many types of 
zoning decisions. See, e.g., Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 
98, 104 P. 3d 1208 (applying illegality analysis to challenge of 
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expansion of gravel pit where another ordinance suggested that use 
was not approved) ; Save Our Canyons v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt 
Lake County, 2005 UT App 285, 528 P. 3d 978 (analyzing allegations 
of improper variance under illegality standard); Patterson v. Utah 
Cty. Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602 (UtahCt. App. 1995) (applying 
illegality analysis to decision allowing airstrip to be built, 
where airstrip layout might violate an ordinance). 
The instant case is particularly well-suited to analysis under 
the illegality prong of the statute, given that it involves the 
interpretation of statutory language. In explaining its low-
deference approach to illegality challenges, the Utah Supreme Court 
stated in Carrier that "the interpretation of ordinances and 
statutes remains firmly within the province of the courts." 
Carrier, 2004 UT 98, 3[ 28. Further, it is this Court's province to 
ensure that the City construed the ordinance liberally in favor of 
the property owner. See Patterson, 893 P. 2d at 606. 
The City has specific language in its ordinance that enumer-
ates, with mandatory language, how certain rights are to be 
determined. In assessing M&S's rights, the City violated the 
ordinance. The lower Court should therefore have treated plain-
tiffs' appeal as an illegality challenge under the statute and 
review the decision for correctness with only a level of "non-
binding deference." See Carrier, 104 P. 3d 1216.x 
1
 M&S re-emphasizes that its position does not depend upon the Court's 
selection of the correctness standard under the illegality prong of the statute. 
Even if the Court were to opt for the higher level of deference applied under the 
arbitrary and capricious standard, the City's decision was sufficiently 
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A. There Is No Evidence That the Drafters of the Ordinance 
Intended to Completely Terminate All Nonconforming Uses. 
Provo's new argument about the City Council's legislative 
intent obscures the hard realities of the City's arbitrary calcula-
tions. The City cites a Utah enabling statute that grants authority 
to cities to set amortization periods for the recovery of invest-
ments in nonconforming uses. The City suggests the state statute's 
reference to utermination of nonconforming uses" somehow determines 
the full scope and full intent of the Provo City Council in adopting 
the particular ordinance in this case. See Provo City Reply/Opp. 
Memo., p. 6. The statute, however, is permissive--allowi.ng cities 
to pass finite amortization periods, but does not mandate that they 
do so. Indeed, the statute has nothing at all to say about how the 
amortization period is to be calculated, or whether an infinite 
amortization period might be acceptable, reasonable, or even 
required under some circumstances. 
The state statute is the only source offered for Provo City's 
oft-repeated, bedrock assertion that the ordinance manifests an 
intention to bring all nonconforming uses to an end. Based on the 
evidence on the record, the drafters of the ordinance might have had 
any number of other intentions--including the intention to protect 
the investments of the owners of nonconforming properties. The 
City's argument is also defeated by the plain language of the 
ordinance. Under the City's logic, the same drafters who adopted 
irrational and lacking in support that it should have been overturned. 
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an ordinance meant to completely terminate a l l nonconforming uses 
a lso in se r t ed a formula tha t allows some nonconforming uses to 
continue i n d e f i n i t e l y . The City would have the Court adopt i t s own 
view of the in t en t ions of the d r a f t e r s , even where tha t view would 
v i o l a t e the p l a i n language and completely foreseeable outcome of 
the ordinance. This r e s u l t i s unacceptable.2 
B. The City Cannot Protest M&S's Use of Depreciation since 
the City Has Used Depreciation in I t s Own Calculations. 
The City a l so ra i sed the new argument that M&S's proposed open-
ended extension inco r rec t ly "double-dips" in i t s accounting, 
decreasing i t s net income figure by subt rac t ing deprecia t ion from 
i t s t o t a l r e c e i p t s . 3 This argument has an insurmountable flaw. The 
City presumably did not include depreciat ion in i t s i n i t i a l 
ca l cu la t ion of net income, but s t i l l reached a negative net income 
f igure of -$27,004.60--a number tha t would assure an i n f i n i t e 
outcome.4 See March 8, 2004 Janice Larsen Memo., p . 2, sect ions 1 
and 5, BOA Record Exhibit 26. (Alternat ively, if the City did 
include deprec ia t ion in t h i s ca lcu la t ion , i t can hardly argue 
against i t s inc lus ion now.) Thus, even following the C i ty ' s 
2 Pai red wi th t he se a s s e r t i o n s of the d r a f t e r s ' unknown and unknowable 
i n t e n t i o n s i s ano the r c o u n t e r - t e x t u a l o b s e s s i o n - - t h e i l l u s o r y requirement t h a t 
a m o r t i z a t i o n p e r i o d s conform to some undefined s tandard of " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s . " See 
Provo C i ty Reply/Opp. Memo. pp. 3 , 7 , 8 , 9 , 1 0 . Because the concept has no b a s i s in 
t h e o rd inance , t h e argument w i l l not be taken up h e r e . 
3
 Again, t h e Ci ty c i t e s no a u t h o r i t y for the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t c r e d i t for 
d e p r e c i a t i o n i s i n c o n s i s t e n t wi th t he purposes of an a m o r t i z a t i o n p e r i o d . 
4 Regardless of how o the r p a r t s of the formula a r e c a l c u l a t e d , i t i s 
i n d i s p u t a b l e t h a t a n e g a t i v e ne t income f i gu re w i l l always r e s u l t in an i n f i n i t e 
a m o r t i z a t i o n p e r i o d . 
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figures, which do not include depreciation, the result is an open-
ended extension. 
The City's problem, of course, is that it did not use the 
above net income figure consistently, choosing to concoct a 
different number for net income in the second instance. See March 
8, 2004 Janice Larsen Memo., p. 2, section 6. Even though M&S spent 
considerable space highlighting this inconsistency in its first 
memorandum, the City still has never explained why it applied two 
completely different figures for "net income from the property" in 
different parts of the formula, one nearly $60,000 greater than the 
other. If the true "net income" is used consistently throughout the 
formula, the result of the calculation is an infinite amortization 
period. In short, the problem is not with the inclusion of 
depreciation. The parties agree that M&S's true net income was 
negative. The problem is that Provo City did not like the results 
of its own mathematic formula, so it arbitrarily cooked its own 
hypothetical "net income" numbers for part of the formula. 
C. The City's New Rationale for Excluding Unprofitable Years 
from the Net Income Total Is Contradictory and Unsupported, 
In its brief, the City offers another new argument for 
including only 1999 and 2000 in its second method of calculating 
"net income," stating that it preferred to use only the periods that 
came after the total investment in the property was completed. This 
argument has two terminal flaws. 
First, this new rationale directly contradicts the explanation 
for the decision given by the City's accountant in her memorandum 
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of March 8, 2004. In that memorandum, Ms. Larsen stated that she 
included only 1999 and 2000 in her calculation of net income because 
"the rental income from periods prior to 1999 would not be an 
accurate reflection of expected future rental." See March 8, 2004 
Janice Larsen Memo., p. 3, BOA Record Exhibit 26. Now, when faced 
with the allegation that the decision was arbitrary and illegal, the 
City has changed its story, asserting that figures for 1996-1998 
were excluded because M&S's investment was still ongoing in those 
years. Ms. Larsen's explanation was impermissible, as it shows an 
unprincipled attempt to divine *expected future rental"--a concept 
not found in the ordinance. The City's new explanation is also 
unsupported, since the ordinance says nothing about waiting until 
an investment is completed to begin totaling net income. Neither 
explanation rests on any principled basis found in the ordinance or 
elsewhere. 
Secondly, the City's records reflect that M&S's investment in 
the property didn't end in 1998. As shown in the City Accountant's 
chart, M&S also made capital improvements in 1999. See March 8, 2004 
Janice Larsen Memo., p. 2, section 5. Thus, if it is true that the 
accountant was using data only from years after the investment was 
complete, she should have excluded 1999 from the total. But she did 
not. The City's newly adopted rationale for excluding the unprofit-
able years from its net income total is an afterthought, is 
contradicted by the evidence, and is unsupported by the language of 
the ordinance. 
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The very scheme suggested by the City i s i r r a t i o n a l — suggest-
ing tha t i f the home had been operat ing for 40 years and was given 
a new t o i l e t and bathroom sink in the 39th year, the net income 
f igure would then be ca lcu la ted s t a r t i n g only a f t e r the date of the 
upgrade. Not only i s there no r a t i o n a l reason to perform the 
ca lcu la t ion in such a way, there i s no reason to bel ieve tha t such 
was done here . 5 
D. P la in t i f f s Are Entitled to an Open-ended Extension as 
They Have Provided Clear Evidence of Prejudice. 
As a f ina l argument, Provo City contends tha t even i f the 
C i t y ' s decis ion i s found to be a r b i t r a r y , capr ic ious , or i l l e g a l , 
M&S must s t i l l show tha t i t was prejudiced by the decision in order 
to obtain i t s des i red remedy. While M&S does not agree with the 
C i t y ' s exaggerated descr ip t ions of the s t r ingency of t h i s s tandard, 
M&S has met the burden se t forth in Springville Citizens for a 
Better Community v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P. 2d 332.6 
Provo City c i t e s both Springville Citizens and Gardner v. 
Perry City, 2000 UT App 1, 994 P.2d 811, in arguing tha t the showing 
of pre judice i s "a d i f f i c u l t — i f not impossible--burden." However, 
in each of those cases , the zoning a u t h o r i t i e s were accused of 
5 I t should a l s o be noted again here t h a t M&S d id have r e n t e r s l i v i n g i n t h e 
home and r e c e i v e d some r e n t a l income dur ing t h e y e a r s 1996-1998. See F i n a n c i a l 
Sta tements for 1996-1998, a t t a c h e d as Exhib i t C t o March 26, 2002 A p p l i c a t i o n for 
Amor t iza t ion , BOA Record Exh ib i t 12. 
6 I t i s u n c l e a r whether the showing of p r e j u d i c e i s r e q u i r e d in appea l s from 
a l l zoning c a s e s , or whether t h i s s t andard a p p l i e s only where the appeal a l l e g e s 
t h a t p rocedura l r u l e s were v i o l a t e d . Without conceding t h a t t h e showing of 
p r e j u d i c e i s r e q u i r e d h e r e , where the a l l e g a t i o n i s of a s u b s t a n t i v e d e f e c t i n 
implementat ion of an o rd inance , M&S contends t h a t i t e a s i l y meets t h i s s t a n d a r d . 
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having missed insignificant procedural steps in making their 
challenged decisions. Thus, the plaintiffs were saddled with the 
difficult task of showing that if the minor procedural rules had all 
been fulfilled, the outcomes would have been substantively differ-
ent. That is not the case here. In this case, M&S alleges that the 
ordinance was wrongly implemented in a very specific way, which 
resulted in a 22-year amortization period. If the ordinance had 
been correctly implemented, using only one proper definition of 
"net income from the property," the amortization period would have 
been infinite. Thus, rather than presenting a speculative hypo-
thetical, M&S has suffered a specific miscalculation, resulting in 
a specified loss in the use of its property after a certain amount 
of time. 
This Court has the authority to overrule the determination of 
the City, state which of the City's steps were arbitrary, capri-
cious, or illegal, and set forth the results of the formula as if 
it had been implemented correctly. See Carrier, 104 P. 3d at 1212 and 
122 0 (upholding district court's ruling voiding Planning Commission 
decision) ; Wells v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 936 
P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (vacating Board of Adjustment's 
grant of illegal and arbitrary variance) . If the Court finds that 
M&S's true "net income from the property" was negative (a fact which 
is undisputed), it should mandate an open-ended exemption period 
for M&S, since any negative net income will produce that result. 
To take such a course would not be to substitute the Court's 
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judgment for the City's; it would be to apply the ordinance in the 
only way it can rationally and legally be applied. 
II. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE LOWER COURT TO DISMISS PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT 
"TOGETHER WITH ALL CLAIMS AND THEORIES ASSERTED THEREIN. 
A. Plaintiffs Properly Pled Their As-Applied Challenges 
in their Complaint. 
Plaintiffs' as-applied challenges to Provo City Ordinance 
2000-15 ("the Ordinance") are clearly stated in the Complaint. 
Count One of the Complaint in matter 000403654 states a claim for 
"Violations of Utah Constitution" as follows: 
Provo City's zoning changes . . . constitute a 
taking of Plaintiffs' property without just or due 
compensation. The zoning changes are so harsh and 
substantial in comparison with the trivial public 
benefit, if any, so as to make the zoning changes 
confiscatory. 
See Complaint, 1 41, attached as Exhibit A. (R. 0014) 
The Complaint offers further explanation of this as-applied 
challenge: 
Provo City's zoning changes, as described above, 
violate due process because the imposition of the 
zoning changes to the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home do 
not bear a relationship to the public health, 
safety, welfare or morals. In the alternative, the 
changes are more severe and strict than those 
necessary to achieve valid police power purposes. 
Id. at I 43. 
Count Two of the Complaint states a claim for "Unreasonable 
Regulation," explaining that: 
Provo City's zoning ordinances . . . and the appli-
cation of those ordinances to the subject properties 
is arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, has no 
reasonably debatable relationship to the public 
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health, welfare, safety, or morals, is inconsistent 
with surrounding areas and uses, and is more strict 
or severe than necessary. 
Id. at I 49. 
As stated in the Complaint, Plaintiffs have claims against 
Provo City under doctrines of takings law, due process, zoning 
abuses, and misapplication of the police power. Each of these 
challenges is brought in the context of Provo City's application of 
its Ordinance to the subject properties. None of them relates to 
a facial challenge of the Ordinance, nor to the City's implementa-
tion of its amortization formula. 
B. Plaintiffs' As-Applied Challenges Have Never Been 
Adjudicated. 
Provo City contends that every claim pled by Plaintiffs in this 
consolidated case was either resolved by Anderson v. Provo City 
Corp., or in the Court's ruling on the Cross-Motions for Summary 
Judgment. See 2 005 UT 5, 108 P.3d 701, attached as Exhibit B. A 
brief review of each of these proceedings shows that the as-applied 
challenges raised in the complaint remain unaddressed. The 
Anderson case explicitly purports to rule on only four limited 
questions: 1. "Provo City's Authority to Issue Ordinance 2000-15" 
(at SI 11); 2. The Ordinance's effect on "Equal Protection And 
Uniform Operation of Laws" (at SI 17); 3. Whether the Ordinance 
constitutes a ''Restraint on Alienation" (at SI 26); and 4. Whether 
the Ordinance unlawfully burdens the "Right to Travel" (at SI 28) . 
The Anderson court also explicitly characterized the claims before 
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it as facial. Id. at 8.7 The case does not address any takings, 
due process, zoning abuse, or police power challenges in the as-
applied context. 
The Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment dealt with a different 
set of issues, namely "the issue of whether the City's amortization 
determination was arbitrary, capricious or illegal." See Provo 
City's Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment, p. 2. The lower 
Court agreed with this characterization of the issues before it on 
summary judgment, writing in its Memorandum Decision that "the 
issue in this case is whether the Board of Adjustments correctly 
interpreted and applied the Ordinance when using the formula to 
calculate Plaintiff's amortization period." See January 30, 2006 
Memorandum Decision, p. 3. The lower Court's final statement of its 
ruling remained consistent with that reading of the issues, award-
ing "summary judgment to Defendant Provo City Corporation and 
affirm[ing] the Board of Adjustment decision applying the twenty-
two year, three month amortization period to the M&S property." Id. 
at 6. 
To summarize the above rulings, the Anderson case resolved the 
facial constitutional challenges to the statute, and the lower 
Court's ruling on summary judgment involved the challenge to the 
City's application of the amortization formula. Neither of these 
proceedings addressed the as-applied challenges listed above, 
7The Court's mention of a stipulation dismissing as-applied claims in the 
underlying proceeding did not affect the claims of Plaintiffs in this case. 
Anderson, 2 005 UT 5, I 8. 
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namely, Plaintiff's takings, due process, zoning abuse, and police 
power challenges. Provo City can point to no ruling, order, or 
stipulation that finally resolves any of these as-applied questions. 
Because the City is unable to show where Plaintiffs' as-
applied challenges have been resolved, it resorts to the argument 
that Plaintiffs were on notice that the City hoped to resolve all 
pending claims by way of its Motion for Summary Judgment. And yet, 
this argument cuts both ways. At the hearing on January 27, 2006, 
the first statement to the Court by Plaintiffs' counsel was to 
identify the two main issues remaining in the lawsuit, i.e., 
"as-applied" and "amortization," and to advise the Court that only 
the amortization issues, and not the as-applied issues, were before 
the Court. Provo City raised no objection to Plaintiffs' statement 
of the issues. If the City's position regarding the timeliness of 
objections is to be followed, Provo must live with its failure to 
raise an objection at that time. The argument of who best framed 
the substance of the motions and who should have objected first is 
at best a draw. 
This is more fully proven by a review of the arguments in the 
parties' briefs on the summary judgment motions. At no point did 
either party raise any arguments on the issues of takings, due 
process, zoning, or police power. Neither did these questions ever 
come up at oral argument. Substantive legal claims cannot be 
disposed of merely by a clause in a legal memorandum that purports 
to include the claims but does not even address their substance. 
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Plaintiffs' as-applied challenges to the Ordinance have never been 
finally addressed by this or any other court. Therefore, the 
proposed order purporting to dismiss Plaintiffs' remaining claims 
should be rejected. 
C. The As-Applied Issue Must Be Determined Under the Proper 
Procedural Standards of Rule 56 or Rule 12• 
Provo City makes its first attempt to address the substance of 
Plaintiffs' as-applied challenge in its response to Plaintiff's 
objections to the proposed order. Legal arguments on the merits of 
Plaintiffs' claims are improper in such a forum. Any attempt to 
resolve the merits of Plaintiffs' as-applied challenge must take 
the form of a Motion under the Rules of Civil Procedure, namely a 
Motion to Dismiss under Utah R. Civ. P. 12, or a Motion for Summary 
Judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Plaintiffs should not have been 
required to respond to the City's arguments on the substantive merit 
of their claims in a dispute over the form of a proposed order. It 
suffices to recognize that Plaintiffs' as-applied claims exist, and 
remain undecided. 
III. INTERVENORS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO INTERVENE. 
Intervenors' motion to intervene should have been denied for 
at least three reasons. First and foremost, the Intervenors lack 
standing to intervene because they have not alleged, and cannot prove, 
any special damages peculiar to themselves which will result from the 
proposed settlement or from their (untrue) allegations that zoning 
ordinances will be violated. Second, the motion to intervene is 
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untimely. Finally, the motion fails to satisfy the requirements of 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A. The Interveners Lack Standing Because They Have Not 
Alleged, and Cannot Prove, Any Special Damages over and 
above the Alleged Public Injury Which May Be Caused by the 
Purported Violation of the Zoning Ordinances. 
The Intervenors claim that the proposed settlement will violate 
applicable zoning ordinances and "affect[ ] the character and property 
values of surrounding residential properties and inappropriately 
increase[s] the traffic on neighborhood streets." Intervenors' Memo., 
at 9. This allegation of general damages, however, is insufficient 
to provide the legal standing required for the Intervenors to join 
this lawsuit. 
In Perper v. Pima County, 600 P.2d 52 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), the 
Court of Appeals of Arizona decided a case nearly identical to this 
one. In Perper, plaintiffs filed suit against Pima County alleging 
that the County had improperly denied their request for rezoning and 
a variance. Prior to trial, the parties reached a settlement, and a 
judgment was entered rezoning the plaintiffs' property pursuant to the 
settlement agreement. Shortly thereafter, neighboring property owners 
filed a petition that requested an order "setting aside the [ ] 
judgment, setting the earlier case for trial, and permitting appel-
lants to intervene in it." Id. at 53. In support of their petition 
for intervention, the neighboring property owners made an argument 
identical to that of the Intervenors here: 
The petition alleges that appellants own property affected 
by the outcome of the earlier case in that the rezoning 
would decrease property values in the whole area, there 
would be increased traffic and noise, and the residential 
atmosphere and scenery would be substantially destroyed. 
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Id. The court dismissed the petition and the neighboring property 
owners appealed. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the 
dismissal of the petition and held: 
The board of supervisors had authority to agree to the 
consent judgment in the earlier case. Had the board 
originally granted the appellees' rezoning request despite 
appellants' objections at the public hearing, appellants 
would have had no standing to maintain a suit to nullify 
the variance. An adjacent property owner who suffers no 
special damage from the granting of a variance cannot seek 
judicial review of an administrative decision to grant a 
variance. To be aggrieved, the plaintiff must have 
sustained damage peculiar to himself. Appellants' petition 
alleges only general economic and aesthetic losses. 
Id. at 54 (emphasis added and citations omitted). 
The same is true in this case. Provo City has authority to agree 
to the agreed-upon settlement terms. The Intervenors did not allege, 
and cannot prove, any special damages peculiar to themselves. Rather, 
they have merely alleged general economic damages and aesthetic 
losses. Utah courts also hold that such general allegations are 
insufficient to entitle an individual to maintain an action for an 
alleged violation of a zoning ordinance. In Culbertson v. Board of 
County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642, 
the Utah Supreme Court reconfirmed this basic rule: 
A private individual must both allege and prove special 
damages peculiar to himself in order to entitle him to 
maintain an action to enjoin violation of a zoning ordi-
nance . His damage must be over and above the public injury 
which may be caused by the violation of the zoning ordi-
nance. 
Id. at 657 (emphasis in original) (quoting Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 
938, 939 (Utah 1976)). 
The Intervenors have not and cannot allege any special damage 
peculiar to themselves. The most they can even allege (and even this 
they could never likely prove) is general damage to the public in 
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general, such as increased traffic or the like.8 Such allegations are 
insufficient to give the Intervenors standing under the rules set 
forth in Culbertson, Perper, and other cases. The motion to intervene 
therefore should have been denied as a matter of law. 
B. The Motion to Intervene Was Untimely. 
Rule 2 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure governs the 
procedure for intervention. The first requirement under both Rule 
24(a) and Rule 24(b) is that the intervenor make a ''timely applica-
tion." Rule 24(a) and (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. "Use 
of the word 'timely' in the Rule requires that the timeliness of the 
application be determined under the facts and circumstances of each 
particular case, and in the sound discretion of the court." Republic 
Ins. Group v. Doman, 114 P.2d 1130, 1131 (Utah 1989) (quoting Jenner 
v. Real Estate Serv., 659 P.2d 1072, 1073-74 (Utah 1983)). 
In Republic Insurance Group, the district court denied a motion 
to intervene as untimely. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed 
the denial of the motion to intervene and held: 
The "facts and circumstances" of this case are as follows: 
Defendant knew this action was pending prior to his attempt 
to intervene. His motion for intervention stated, "Movant 
had previously been under the impression that defendants 
were adequately represented by counsel and their interests 
were adequately protected and represented." His motion was 
not filed until every fact necessary for a ruling on the 
motion for summary judgment had been deemed admitted and a 
ruling had been requested on the motion. Given these facts 
and circumstances, i.e. , Duke's apparent notice and opportu-
nity to intervene at an earlier stage of the proceeding and 
the ripeness of the case for summary judgment at the time 
the motion to intervene was made, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 
Id. at 1131 (emphasis added). 
8M&S specifically denies that the proposed settlement or M&S's use of the 
property causes any harm to anyone, specific or general. 
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The same reasoning applies here. The Intervenors knew that this 
lawsuit was pending for over two years prior to filing their motion 
to intervene. They apparently were content to have Provo City 
represent their interests during that time. M&S and Provo City had 
invested substantial time and resources in reaching a resolution. 
Then, nearly three years later and on the eve of settlement, the 
Intervenors filed their motion to intervene because they did not like 
the agreed upon outcome of the dispute. It was simply too late. 
Given the Intervenors' knowledge and opportunity to intervene at an 
earlier stage of the proceeding, and the fact that the parties had 
reached a settlement, the lower court should have denied the motion 
to intervene as untimely. 
C. The Intervenors Cannot Intervene in this Lawsuit as a 
Matter of Right. 
Intervention of right is governed by Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. It provides: 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permit-
ted to intervene in an action: (1) when a stat-
ute confers an unconditional right to intervene; 
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction which is 
the subject of the action and he is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede his ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant's 
interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties. 
In addition to their motion being untimely, the Intervenors 
cannot satisfy either of the tests for intervention of right. 
First, there is no applicable statute which ''confers an 
unconditional right to intervene." The Intervenors argue that Utah 
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Code Ann. § 10-9-1002 (1) (a) confers such a right, but they are 
mistaken. Section 10-9-1002(1)(a) provides: 
A municipality or any owner of real estate within the 
municipality in which violations of this chapter or 
ordinances enacted under the authority of this chapter 
occur or are about to occur may, in addition to other 
remedies provided by law, institute: 
(i) injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other 
appropriate actions; or 
(ii) proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove 
the unlawful building, use, or act. 
Although Section 10-9-1002 (1) (a) allows property owners to 
institute various proceedings and actions when an alleged zoning 
violation occurs or is about to occur, it does not "confer [ ] an 
unconditional right to intervene." An example of a statute which 
confers such a right is 28 U.S.C. § 2347. This section confers an 
unconditional right to intervene in the context of federal agency 
orders. It states, in relevant part: "Communities, associations, 
corporations, firms and individuals, whose interests are affected by 
the order of the agency, may intervene in any proceeding to review the 
order. " In stark contrast, Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1002(1) (a) fails to 
even address intervention. The Intervenors may attempt to institute 
a separate lawsuit under Section 10-9-1002(1) (a) to enforce the zoning 
ordinances, but they do not have the unconditional right to intervene 
in this lawsuit. 
Additionally, the Intervenors cannot satisfy the test for 
intervention of right under Rule 24(a)(2). First, the Intervenors do 
not have an interest in this dispute or in the properties that are the 
subject of this dispute. As shown above, their alleged interest in 
enforcing the zoning ordinances and maintaining "the character and 
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property values of surrounding residential properties" is insufficient 
under Utah law to justify intervention. The Intervenors have not 
alleged, and cannot prove, any special damages peculiar to themselves. 
Moreover, the Intervenors' interests have been and are represented by 
Provo City. Provo City's interests in enforcing its zoning ordinances 
are aligned with its residents. If the Intervenors did not believe 
that Provo City adequately represented their interests, then they 
should have requested intervention over two years earlier, when this 
lawsuit commenced. Finally, the motion to intervene is untimely. See 
supra Section II. The Court should not have allowed the Intervenors 
to wait over two years and then intervene on the eve of a final 
settlement. 
The Intervenors argue that the proposed settlement violates 
certain procedures required by Provo City Code. This argument, 
however, fails to recognize that Provo City has agreed to the terms 
of a settlement in an effort to settle a lawsuit which challenges the 
validity of the City's zoning ordinances. If the proposed settlement 
takes place, Provo City was not giving up something for nothing. 
Rather, the City was making sure that M&S received only that to which 
it is legally entitled under Provo City Ordinances. In return, M&S 
agreed to give up its challenge to the validity of the ordinances. 
The Intervenors' untimely (and untrue) argument that the settlement 
would result in general economic damages and aesthetic losses does not 
justify intervention. 
In summary, the Intervenors should not have been permitted to 
intervene in this lawsuit as a matter of right. 
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CONCLUSION 
Following extensive negotiations that had extended over more 
than two years and that resulted in a settlement of all issues that 
both M&S and Provo City believed were in their respective best 
interests, the lower court, in error, allowed Intervenors to 
intervene even though, as a matter of law, they have no standing in 
this case. Provo City then reversed course in response to political 
pressure applied by the Intervenors and adopted a political and 
highly improper application of its Owner Occupant Ordinance to 
M&S's property, arrived at through clearly arbitrary, capricious, 
and illegal manipulation of provisions of the Ordinance. The lower 
court, in error, affirmed the City's determination. The lower court 
also erroneously dismissed plaintiffs' xx as-applied" claims that 
were pleaded but never briefed, argued, or otherwise decided by the 
lower court. 
This Court should reverse the judgment of the lower court and 
order that, under the Ordinance and the undisputed facts, M&S is 
entitled to an infinite period of time to recoup its investment, and 
is therefore exempt from the owner-occupant provisions of the 
Ordinance. In the alternative, this Court should reverse the lower 
court's order allowing intervention and should remand this case for 
consideration of the "as-applied" claims. 
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DATED this 5& day of November, 2006. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Reed L. Martineau 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants M&S 
Cox Investments, LC, Mervyn Cox and 
Sue Cox 
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This ordinance was passed by the Municipal Council of Provo City, on the_ 
fJLfnL.0* , 2000 on a-roll call vote as described above. Signed 
• - / ^ day of Q^UJL 
+< <V ^ - day 
C^/Cfj^J 
APPROVAL BY MAYOR 
This ordinance is approved by me this 
ORDINANCE 2000-15 
III 
CITY RECORDER'S CERTIFICATE AND ATTEST 
This ordinance was recorded in the office of the Provo City Recorder on 
/Q "" day of CJIJIXJL 2000, with a short summary being published on 
_ g _ L _ d a y of (jjii/Dy 2000, in The Daily Herald, a newspaper published 
in Provo, Utah. I hereby certify and attest that the foregoing constitute a true and accurate record 
of proceedings with respect to Ordinance Number 2000- / £ 
the_ 
the 
Signed this /O day of_ 2000. 
{] City Reckrdsr_7 
ORDINANCE 2000-15 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER 14.30 (SUPPLEMENTARY 
RESIDENTIAL OVERLAY ZONE) OF THE PRO VO CITY CODE TO RJEQU1RE 
OWNER OCCUPANCY IN ORDER TO HAVE AN ACCESSORY DWELLING 
UNIT AND TO REGULATE NONCONFORMING DWELLINGS. 
WHEREAS, it is proposed that Chapter 14.30 of the Provo City Code be modified to require 
owner occupancy in order to have an accessory dwelling unit and to regulate nonconforming 
dwellings; and, 
WHEREAS, on October 13,1999 and January 26,2000 the Planning Commission held duly 
noticed public hearings to consider two proposals submitted by the applicants (denominated as 
Proposed Text Amendments #land #2) and recommended that a third alternative proposal be 
adopted (denominated as Proposed Text Amendment #3); and, 
WHEREAS, the Municipal Council staff and City Attorney' s office have developed a further 
alternative proposal (denominated as Proposed Text Amendment #4); and, 
WHEREAS, on April 4,2000 the Municipal Council held a duly noticed public hearing to 
receive public comment and ascertain the facts regarding this matter, which facts and comments are 
found in the hearing record; and, 
WHEREAS, after considering the Planning Commission's recommendation, and facts and 
comments presented to the Municipal Council, the Council discussed changes to the proposed text 
amendments and developed another proposed amendment as set forth below; and, 
WHEREAS, the Council finds (i) the proposed amendment carries out the policy and intent 
of the City's General Plan; (ii) the Planning and Zoning Title of Provo City should be amended as 
set forth below and (iii) such ordinance i^mendment reasonably furthers the health, safety and general 
welfare of the citizens of Provo City. 
NOW, THEREFORE, be it ordained by the Municipal Council of Provo City, Utah, as 
follows: 
PART I: 
Chapter 14.30 of the Provo City Code is hereby amended as follows: 
Chapter 14,30. S - Supplementary Residential Overlay Zone. 
14.30.010. Purpose and Objectives. 
14.30.020. Use in Combination. 
14.30.030. Permitted Uses. 
14.30.040. Development Standards. 
14.30.050. Area of Zone. 
14.30.060. Petition for Zone Adoption. 
14.30.070. Parking Requirements. 
14.30.080. Nonconforming Uses. 
14.30.010. Purpose and Objectives. 
The purpose of the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone is to recognize the unique 
character of Provo City as a "university community" and to accommodate supplementary living 
accommodations in some appropriate single family residential areas of the community. These 
provisions are intended to meet community demands for residential accommodations for 
semitransient residents in areas of the community adjacent to major educational and institutional 
uses. This overlay zone is designed to provide an alternative living environment for said 
semi-transient residents to that normally found within the higher density multiple residential zones. 
The (S) overlay zone will therefore protect and enhance the desirable aesthetic characteristics of the 
underlying single family residential zone. An R-l zone with a Supplementary Residential (S) 
Overlay as described in this Chapter is intended to continue the very low density of an R-1 zone. The 
sole function of the overlay is to permit alternate methods of housing the occupancy otherwise 
permitted in an 
R-l zone. 
14.30.020. Use in Combination. 
(1) The Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone may be used only in combination with 
the R-l (Single Family Residential) Zone as designated herein. The provisions of the (S) Overlay 
Zone shall become supplementary to the provisions of the zone with which it is combined. The (S) 
Overlay Zone shall not be applied to any land area as an independent zone. 
14.30.030. Permitted Uses. 
Uses permitted in the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be limited to those 
uses listed as permitted uses in an Rl Zone with the following additional permitted uses: 
(1) Accessory Dwelling Unit: For purposes of the Supplementary Residential Overlay Zone 
only, a structure which is in all respects by design, construction, and appearance a single family 
residence, qualifying as such within an Rl Zone, may in addition have an accessory dwelling unit 
constructed therein if the accessory dwelling unit: 
(a) Is located in a basement or in a second level above ground level and there is a 
useable interior connection between the accessory dwelling unit and the main structure; and, 
(b) Does not alter the appearance of the structure as a single family residence, and 
does not cause the structure within which the accessory dwelling is located to resemble in 
any degree a side-by-side, side-to-back, back-to-back, or other type of duplex unit. A 
structure having an accessory dwelling unit under the provisions of this Section shall have 
no more than two (2) kitchens within the structure. 
(2) Occupancy: For purposes of a one family dwelling with an accessory dwelling unit, which 
is authorized by and conforms to the requirements stated above in this Section, the following 
occupancy rules shall apply: 
(a) One of the dwelling units within the structure shall be occupied by: 
(i) One (1) person living alone; or 
(ii) The head of household and all persons related to the head of household 
by marriage or adoption as a parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, brother, sister, 
uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, great-grandparent or great-grandchild. For purposes of 
this paragraph, two (2) or more of these persons must share the legal relationship of 
husband and wife, or parent and child or grandparent and child. Such parent or 
grandparent must actually reside in the subject dwelling. 
(b) The remaining dwelling unit within the structure shall be occupied by no more 
than four (4) related or unrelated persons 
(c) One of the dwelling units within the structure shall be occupied by the owner of 
the property. Owner occupancy shall not be required when: 
(i) The owner has abona fide? temporary absence of three (3) years or less for 
activities such as temporary job assignments*- sabbaticals, or voluntary service. 
Indefinite jperiods of absen%from.the, home shall not qualify for this exception. 
(ii) The owner^rplfc^ nursing home, assisted living facility 
Qr.Qther.similar facility,: 
(3)! Owner occupano |^ass defined inJhis section shall mean: 
(i) ahuman_b^gjjgh^osjessej^^m4Kan,fifty (50)~percentownersliip,in 
t h e d w e l F n g a i ^ i M ^ of the owner; or 
r^ideng©fsrsMi»^aimg! 
14.30.040. Development Standards. 
All development standards required in the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall 
be the same as those required by the provisions of the underlying zone with which the (S) zone is 
combined. 
14.30.050. Area of Zone. 
The Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be applied to a land area ten (10) 
acres or more which contains at least forty (40) existing dwelling structures, and which is at least 
fifty (50) percent developed. The land area shall be free from islands or peninsulas or any other 
unreasonable boundary line configurations. Additions to an existing (S) Overlay Zone shall be by 
petition which conforms to all provisions of this Chapter except acreage, and number of dwellings 
14.30.060. Petition for Zone Adoption. 
(1) Property owners may request application of the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay 
Zone to any land meeting the minimum area and boundary requirements by a petition in 
conformance with the provisions of Section 14 02 020, Provo City Code signed by not less than 
seventy (70) percent of the property owners within the area requested for said zoning amendment. 
Said petition shall indicate that all signers are proponents of the amendment being proposed. 
(2) For purposes of this Section: 
(a) There shall be one (1) petition signature for each legally created lot, provided, 
however, that no more than fifty (50) percent of the signatures on any petition shall come 
from any one (1) petitioner; 
(b) In the event a fee title owner and a contract purchaser shall disagree on the 
signing of a petition for purposes of this Chapter, a contract purchaser not in default shall 
have the right to sign a petition, and 
(c) Only an owner or contract purchaser, acting personally or through a written power 
of attorney, may sign a petition 
14,30.070. Parking Requirements. 
Parking requirements for the Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone shall be as 
required by the provisions of Section 14 37 090, Provo City Code, except that any single dwelling 
with an occupied accessory dwelling shall have at least two (2) additional off-street parking spaces, 
for a total of four (4) spaces. In no case shall the number of off-street parking spaces be less than the 
number of vehicles being maintained on the premises. If the owner wishes to rent to more unrelated 
individuals than there are supplementary parking spaces, this shall only be allowed under the 
following conditions: 
(1) Owners shall take the initiative in enforcing compliance by tenants with the limitations 
imposed herein upon the number of vehicles allowed their tenants and if a tenant fails to comply 
with such limitations after appropriate notice, owners shall forthwith evict such tenant; 
(2) Owners shall maintain a list of all tenants, together with the make and license plate 
number of their respective vehicles, which owners shall provide to Provo City upon request; 
(3) Owners shall enter into a covenant with Provo City that they will not rent to tenants 
having a total number of vehicles in excess of the total number of supplementary parking spaces 
(over and above the two spaces required for the resident family) provided by owners, without the 
prior written consent of Provo City, which covenant shall be binding on all subsequent owners of 
the subject apartments. 
14.30.080. Nonconforming Uses. 
(1) Nonconforming uses relating to occupancy arc extinguished by adoption after January 
1,1083, of a Supplementary Residential (S) Overlay Zone. 9J^^S^^?Sk 6%efiJiM^°?^IS 
^subparagraph(2) of ihis'section, every dwellmgunit in the (3$j(i^ 
requirements of this Chapter* 
(2)No3iwithstandmg the provisionsjof Chapter 14.36 of thisTffie, a one-family dwellingwifh 
an accessory d ^ i f i f l ^ ^ which v/as legall^ 
established shall not be required to c o n f o m ^ 
s t a n % d | o J ^ ^ 
apgly.foran extensibnof time to compl£'^m&^ subject 
to the'provisions of Section 14.3G.09& of this jChapter; 
14.30.090. Termination of Nonconforming Uses - Recovery of Investment 
(1) The Community Development Director or his designee shall grant an owner of property 
affected by Subsection 14.30.080(2) of this Chapter an extension of the time required to conform 
with such section if: 
(a) the owner: 
(i) by August 4,2000 files a notice of intent to apply for a time extension as, 
provided in this section; and 
(ii) by April 4,2001 files a complete application for an extension of time as 
provided in this section. 
(b); the pwner^ s extension of time demonstrates by a preponderan;^ 













A. Whenever the provisions of this ordinance conflict with the provisions of any other 
ordinance or part thereof enacted before this ordinance, the provisions of this ordinance shall prevail. 
B. This ordinance and its various sections, clauses and paragraphs are hereby declared to be 
severable. If any part, sentence, clause or phrase is adjudged to be unconstitutional or invalid, the. 
remainder of the ordinance shall not be affected thereby. 
C. The Municipal Council hereby directs that the official copy of the Provo City Code be 
updated to reflect the provisions enacted by this ordinance. 
D. This ordinance shall take effect immediately after it has been posted or published as 
required by law. 
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JODY K BURNETT (A0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
P. O. Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-5678 
Phone: (801) 521-5678 
Fax: (801) 364-4500 
DAVID C. DLXON (0890) 
ASSISTANT CITY ATTORNEY 
PROVO CITY 
351 West Center Street 
Provo, UT 84601 
Phone: (801) 852-6141 
Fax: (801) 852-6150 
Attorneys for Defendant 
F3LED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
4-M-0(g_^gpeputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
M&S INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a Utah limited 
liability company, MERVYN COX AND 
SUSAN COX, 
Plaintiffs, 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Consolidated 
Civil No. 000403654 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
This matter came before the above-entitled Court, the Honorable Steven L. Hansen 
presiding, for consideration of cross-motions for summary judgment on all of the claims 
asserted in this consolidated action. A hearing on the motions was held before die Court 
on January 27, 2006. The plaintiffs were represented by Reed L. Martineau and Ryan B. 
Bell. Defendant was represented by Jody K Burnett and David C. Dixon. 
Following the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement, and having reviewed the legal memoranda and exhibits submitted by the 
parties and having considered the arguments of counsel, issued its Memorandum Decision 
dated January 30, 2006, granting defendant Provo City's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and denying plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to that Memorandum 
Decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant Provo City's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted 
on the basis that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the Board of Adjustment's 
decision was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal and was supported by substantial evidence 
in the record as more fully set forth in the Memorandum Decision of January 30, 2006. 
2. Plaintiffs M&S Investments, L.L.C., Mervyn Cox and Sue Cox's Motion for 
Summary Judgment is hereby denied for the reasons more fully set forth in the 
Memorandum Decision of January 30, 2006. 
3. Based on the foregoing orders and for the reasons more fully set forth 
above, the plaintiffs3 Complaint, together with all claims and theories asserted therein in 
this consolidated action, is hereby dismissed, with prejudice and upon the merits. All 
parties are to bear their own respective costs and attorney's fees. 
DATED this j ^ d a y of /fy#cf 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
126718 1 
Steven LTHansen 
District Court Judge 
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REED L. MARTINEAU (2106)^ 
KEITH A. CALL (A67081/ 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
M&S INVESTMENTS, L.L.C., a 
Utah Limited Liability COMPLAINT 




PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendant. 
Plaintiffs allege as follow: 
PARTIES, JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
1. Plaintiff M&S Investments, L.L.C. (*M&S" ) is a Utah 
Limited Liability Company that does business within the State of 
Utah. 
2. Mervyn and Sue Cox are husband and wife and reside in 
Utah. They are also the owners of M&S. 




to s i\53ra 
civil NO. (2_iOM3b^}f 
Judge -3^ 
4. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction of this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1). 
5. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-13-1 and 78-13-7. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
6. M&S is the owner of two pieces of property located 
within Provo. A home is located on each piece of property. One 
home is located at 1310 North 900 East (the m1310 Home"), and the 
other home is located at 1410 North 900 East (the *1410 Home'') . 
Both homes are in close proximity to and in walking distance from 
the Brigham Young University campus. 
7. M&S purchased the 1310 Home in the summer of 1996. M&S 
purchased the home for the purpose of providing a place to live 
and study for Mervyn and Sue Cox's children and grandchildren, as 
well as other relatives and tenants, while those children, 
grandchildren, and other tenants attended Brigham Young 
University or other schools located in Utah Valley. 
8. When M&S purchased the 1310 Home, it was located within 
a Provo zoning district that allowed student housing and that did 
not require an owner to occupy the home. 
9. In order to comply with Provo's then-existing zoning 
ordinances that would allow more individuals to live in the home, 
M&S undertook to remodel the 1310 Home to add a second story 
apartment. Adding the second story allowed M&S to activate what 
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is known as the *S-overlay" provision in the Provo City zoning 
ordinances. By activating the S-overlay, M&S could house more 
individuals in the 1310 Home. No owner was required to occupy 
any part of the home. 
10. Accordingly, M&S applied to Provo for a building permit 
to allow it to construct a second story on the 1310 Home. Provo 
approved and issued the building permit. 
11. M&S spent a total of over $684,000.00 to purchase the 
1310 Home and to remodel it in a manner that would allow it to 
take advantage of the S-overlay zone. The remodeling was 
completed in 1997. 
12. After the remodeling was completed on the 1310 Home, 
M&S housed certain relatives and others in the 1310 Home. These 
arrangements were at all relevant times in full compliance with 
the applicable Provo City zoning ordinances. 
13. In about September 1999, M&S also purchased the 1410 
Home. M&S purchased the 1410 Home to meet Brigham Young 
University housing regulations which do not permit single male 
BYU students to reside under the same roof as single female BYU 
students. M&S therefore purchased the 1410 Home to house male 
children, grandchildren, and other male tenants while the 1310 
Home was to be used to house female children, grandchildren, and 
other tenants. 
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14. M&S has paid a total of over $226,000 to purchase and 
improve the 1410 Home. 
15. At the time M&S purchased the 1410 Home, applicable 
Provo City zoning ordinances allowed single students to live in 
the home. No owner was required to occupy any part of the home. 
16. M&S has housed certain relatives and others in the 1410 
Home. These arrangements were at all relevant times in full 
compliance with the applicable Provo City zoning ordinances. 
17. At some unknown point in time, and without notice to 
M&S or Mervyn or Sue Cox, Provo changed applicable ordinances or 
regulations relating to who could live in certain portions of the 
1310 Home and the 1410 Home. Previously, M&S was permitted to 
house in part of each home a * family" not exceeding one person 
living alone or two or more persons related by blood within five 
degrees of consanguinity, along with certain other restrictions. 
Without any notice, Provo City changed that ordinance to require 
that one of the dwelling units in each home be occupied only by a 
head of household and persons related to the head of household by 
marriage or adoption as parent, child, grandparent, grandchild, 
brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, niece, great grandparent or 
great grandchild, with certain other restrictions. These more 
recent and more strict * family" requirements will be referred to 
as the "Family-Only Requirement." 
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18. On April 4, 2000, Provo City amended the *S-Overlay" 
provisions of its city ordinances by adopting Ordinance 2000-15. 
The amendment effectively ^down-zones" the 1310 Home and 1410 
Home to require an owner of each home to occupy each home. This 
ordinance will be referred to as the "Owner-Occupant Ordinance." 
19. M&S, a limited liability company, is an entity that 
cannot qualify to * occupy" either home nor can it satisfy the 
Family-Only Requirement. 
20. Provo City adopted the Family-Only Requirement and the 
Owner-Occupant Ordinance without permitting fair or adequate 
input from the citizens of Provo City and, more particularly, 
from the owners of property that are affected by the zoning 
change. 
21. For example, in about October or November of 1999, 
Provo City's planning commission recommended the creation of a 
"citizen's ad hoc committee" to study a proposed Owner-Occupant 
Ordinance. Provo City formed a committee, but appointed people 
to serve on the committee who did not fairly represent the 
community. The committee was, instead, made up of persons 
appointed by Provo City that Provo City knew would favor the 
zoning change and would not study it in an objective manner. 
22. In about January or February, 2000, the Provo City 
planning commission held a meeting at which, for the first time, 
the purported "findings" of the ad hoc committee were disclosed 
to Plaintiffs and others. The purported "findings" favored 
adoption of an Owner-Occupant Ordinance. 
23. Plaintiffs and other interested citizens were not given 
an opportunity to read, study, or evaluate the purported findings 
of the committee. Instead, they were told by the planning 
commission that the meeting would be adjourned for fifteen 
minutes, after which Plaintiffs and other interested citizens who 
might oppose the purported findings would be required to respond 
to such findings. Plaintiffs and other interested citizens had 
no bona fide opportunity to review, critique, or give input to 
the purported findings in any meaningful way. 
24. The Owner-Occupant Ordinance purports to take effect 
over a limited period of time, in a purported, but flawed, 
attempt to allow home owners to recoup their investments on their 
properties. This ""amortization provision" notwithstanding, M&S 
has suffered a taking of its property by Provo City without 
compensation. 
25. The Owner-Occupant Ordinance effectively makes it 
impossible for M&S to use either the 1310 Home or the 1410 Home 
to house single students and other tenants, which was and is the 
very purpose for which these homes were purchased and improved by 
M&S. 
26. The Owner-Occupant Ordinance allows other property 
owners to use their properties in the same way and for the same 
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purposes that are denied to Plaintiffs, simply because of the 
place of residence of the property owner. The Owner-Occupant 
Ordinance thus requires that Plaintiffs discontinue a previously 
lawful and permitted use of their properties not because of their 
use of the properties, but because of their place of residence. 
27. The Owner-Occupant Ordinance and Family-Only 
Requirement, as applied to the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home, serve 
no legitimate public purpose. 
28. The purported "justifications" for the Owner-Occupant 
Ordinance and Family-Only Requirement include such things as 
preserving the family character of the neighborhood, preserving 
property values, and eliminating on-street parking problems. 
29. Because of their location and the nature of the 
surrounding property, the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home are not 
practical, suitable or realistic for single family or owner-
occupied residences. 
30. The 1310 Home and the 1410 Home are fronted by 900 
East, which is a major, four-lane (plus a center turning lane) 
thoroughfare through Provo City. The properties are both located 
in an area that is dedicated primarily to commercial and high-
density housing uses. 
31. A parking lot and strip mall lay directly south of the 
1310 Home. Other businesses and uses in the immediate vicinity 
of the subject properties include the following: restaurants, 
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schools, church, public park, parking areas, and high density 
student housing. 
32. Directly across the street from the 1310 Home and the 
1410 Home are an abandoned supermarket and on-campus (BYU) 
student dormitories in which hundreds, and probably thousands, of 
BYU students are housed. 
33. Within one mile of the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home and 
on or just off 900 East, there is also a BYU laundry facility, 
more high density student housing, the LDS Missionary Training 
Center in which thousands of college-age missionaries are housed, 
the LDS temple, a health center, a conference center, a water 
tank and other intense uses. Between 800 North and approximately 
2100 North on 900 East, a span of approximately two miles, there 
are no more than a half dozen or so homes that have any 
resemblance to a single family home. All of the other properties 
along this span of 900 East are dedicated to much more intense 
uses. 
34. Both the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home have sufficient 
off-street parking to meet all the needs of the occupants and 
visitors of each respective property. 
35. Provo City's zoning changes affecting the 1310 Home and 
the 1410 Home severely damage Plaintiffs by making their 
properties of relatively little value and depriving them the use 
for which the property was purchased, namely, student housing for 
family members and other tenants. These properties are 
irreplaceable for such purposes, since there is very little or no 
property that is similarly situated that could be used to replace 
the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home. 
36. Plaintiffs have been damaged in that, among other 
things, the value of the subject properties has been 
significantly diminished. At all times material to this action, 
a substantial market has existed for the development and/or sale 
of the subject properties as student housing properties. 
37. In adopting the Owner-Occupant Ordinance, in which 
identical uses of property are permitted or denied based on 
ownership of the property, Provo City has exceeded the powers 
granted to municipalities by the State of Utah to regulate land 
uses. 
38. There is a bona fide, actual, and justiciable 
controversy existing between the parties herein. Plaintiffs have 
no adequate remedy at law, and there is an actual, practical and 
present need for declaratory and injunctive relief because, 
unless enjoined, Provo's actions will continue to result in a 
loss of Plaintiffs' substantial rights to the use and enjoyment 
of their property. 
39. Plaintiffs have employed the undersigned attorneys to 
enforce their rights, and have agreed to pay the undersigned 
attorneys a reasonable fee for their services. 
COUNT ONE 
(Violations of Utah Constitution) 
40. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior 
allegations of this Complaint. 
41. Provo City's zoning changes, as described above, 
constitute a taking of Plaintiffs' property without just or due 
compensation. The zoning changes are so harsh and substantial in 
comparison with the trivial public benefit, if any, so as to make 
the zoning changes confiscatory. 
42. Provo City has rejected Plaintiffs1 suggestion that the 
1310 Home and the 1410 Home be excluded from the zoning changes 
that have occurred. 
43. Provo City's zoning changes, as described above, 
violate due process because the imposition of the zoning changes 
to the 1310 Home and the 1410 Home do not bear a relationship to 
the public health, safety, welfare or morals. In the 
alternative, the changes are more severe and strict than those 
necessary to achieve valid police power purposes. 
44. Provo City's actions have also deprived Plaintiffs of 
property without due process of law in that Provo City's actions 
have been arbitrarily and capriciously applied to Plaintiffs. 
45. Provo City's actions, while depriving Plaintiffs of 
property without due process, have resulted and, unless enjoined, 
will continue to result, in substantial and irreparable harm to 
Plaintiffs, including denial to Plaintiffs of the opportunity 
otherwise available to them to use their property for student 
housing purposes. 
46. Provo City's zoning changes, as described above, are a 
violation of Article I, §§ 7 and 22 of the Utah Constitution. 
47. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the Provo 
City zoning changes, as described above, either do not apply to 
the 1310 Home or the 1410 Home or in the alternative, Plaintiffs 
are entitled to payment of compensation from Provo City. 
COUNT TWO 
(Unreasonable Regulation) 
48. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior 
allegations of this Complaint. 
49. Provo City's zoning ordinances (as described above) and 
the application of those ordinances to the subject properties is 
arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, has no reasonably 
debatable relationship to the public health, welfare, safety, or 
morals, is inconsistent with surrounding areas and uses, and is 
more strict or severe than necessary. 
50. Because of their location, the subject properties are 
unsuitable for use for owner-occupied residential purposes. 
COUNT THREE 
(Ultra Vires) 
51. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior 
allegations of this Complaint. 
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52. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-401 et seq. empowers 
municipalities to regulate the use of land, subject to 
limitations. No Utah statute allows municipalities to regulate 
the ownership of land. 
53. Provo City's Owner-Occupant Ordinance, in permitting or 
denying identical uses of land based on the residence of the 
owner or its status as an entity, exceeds the scope of the power 
delegated to Provo City to regulate land uses pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-401 et seq. or pursuant to any other statute. 
54. Plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the 
Owner-Occupant Ordinance is unenforceable as exceeding the power 
of Provo City to regulate land uses. 
COUNT FOUR 
(Declaratory Judgment) 
55. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all prior 
allegations of this Complaint. 
56. Provo City purports to rely on Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-
408 as authority for the * amortization provision" of its Owner-
Occupant Ordinance. 
57. To the extent Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 purports to 
allow Provo City to adopt its Owner-Occupant Ordinance, the 
statute is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs. 
58. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1 et seq. and Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure 57, Plaintiffs are entitled to a 
declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 is unconstitutional as 
applied to them in this case and that the Owner-Occupant 
Ordinance and the Family-Only Requirement are unlawful and 
invalid as applied to Plaintiffs and the subject property. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows: 
A. That the Court enter its order declaring that the 
Owner-Occupant Ordinance and the Family-Only Requirement have 
deprived Plaintiffs of their property without due process of law, 
are unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious, and that such 
ordinances or any other ordinance, regulation, or requirement 
which would have the same effects are unconstitutional as applied 
to the subject properties, and, therefore, are a nullity and of 
no legal force or effect; 
B. That the Court enter its order permanently enjoining 
Provo City from enforcing its Owner-Occupant Ordinance and 
Family-Only Requirement to the subject properties; 
C. For a declaration that Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-408 is 
unconstitutional and unlawful as applied to Plaintiffs; 
B. For a judgment of money damages in favor of Plaintiffs 
and against Defendant in an amount to be proven at trial; 
E. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, and for 
reasonable attorneys fees and costs incurred herein, to the 
maximum extent permitted by law; and 
F. For such other and further relief as the Court deems 
just and appropriate. 
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JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiffs request a trial by jury on all issues so triable, 
DATED this fws day of November, 2000. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By .dd 
Reed L. Martineau 
Kkith A. Call 
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